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Downward Departures: The Lower Envelope of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Few of the lads had ever been in combat and they knew little about the
critical tolerances of fighter aircraft during violent maneuvers. They knew
where the outside of the envelope was, but they didn't know about the part
where you reached the outside and then stretched her a little .
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment explores the established Federal Sentencing
Guidelines downward departure2 jurisprudence. While various au-
thors have examined both upward and downward departures to
outline "the heartland" of the Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter
"the Guidelines"),' this comment traces the downward departure
sentences that comprise the lower envelope or limits of a district
judge's reasonable discretion. To this end, appellate decisions af-
firming downward departures or providing directions for remand
are the principal focus. Major emphasis is given to specific offender
characteristics," circumstances not considered nor fully developed
by the Guidelines,5 as well as enumerated factors that may consti-
tute a basis for departure.'
1. Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff 416 (Farrar Straus Giroux, 1979) (emphasis in origi-
nal). "The 'envelope' was a flight-test term referring to the limits of a particular aircraft's
performance, how tight a turn it could make at such-and-such a speed, and so on. 'Pushing
the outside,' probing the outer limits, of the envelope seemed to be the great challenge and
satisfaction of flight test." Wolfe, The Right Stuff at 12.
2. A downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is a criminal sen-
tence imposed by a district judge below the prescribed sentencing range. Downward depar-
tures are justified when a case involves either atypical or extraordinary circumstances, or
else, mitigating circumstances not adequately considered in the formulation of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 USC App 4, Ch 1, Part A, 4(b) (1992).
3. See Bruce M. Selya and Matthew Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L Rev 1 (1991).
4. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 USC App 4, §§ 5H1.1-5H1.12 (Policy State-
ments) (Nov 1992).
5. USSG § 5K2.0 ps (cited in note 4).
6. USSG §§ 5K2.10-5K2.13, 5K2.16 ps (cited in note 4).
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II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
The Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 (hereinafter "the Act") cre-
ated and empowered the United States Sentencing Commission
(hereinafter "the Commission") "to promulgate guidelines estab-
lishing sentencing ranges for different categories of federal offenses
and defendants."' The objective of the Guidelines "is to avoid un-
warranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct,
while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentencing when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors
not taken into account in the guidelines."9 "The guidelines . . .
further an essential need of the Anglo-American criminal justice
system-to balance the desirability of a high degree of uniformity
against the necessity for the exercise of discretion." 10
The initial Guidelines were submitted to Congress on April 13,
1987 and apply to all offenses committed on or after November 1,
1987." The Guidelines replace a century-old system of indetermi-
nate-sentencing in federal criminal cases. 2 This system had two
7. 18 USC §§ 3551 et seq (1984); 28 USC §§ 991-98 (1984) (Title II of the Compre-
hensive Crime Contror Act of 1984). Subsequent references refer to 18 USC §§ 3551 et seq
(1985 and Supp. 1992); 28 USC §§ 991-98 (Supp 1992).
8. Williams v United States, 112 S Ct 1112, 1117 (1992). The Commission is an
independent judicial agency comprised of seven voting members and one non-voting, ex of-
ficio member. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 1 (cited in note 2). The voting members include a mini-
mum of three federal judges and a maximum of four members of the same political party.
The United States Attorney General, or his designee, is the non-voting member. Mistretta v
United States, 488 US 361, 368 (1989), citing 28 USC § 991(a). Prior to November 1, 1992,
the fifth anniversary of the Act, the Chairman of the United States Parole Commission was
a second non-voting, ex officio member of the Sentencing Commission. 18 USC § 3551(b)(5).
The Commission's "principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for
the federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating de-
tailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal
crimes." USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 1 (cited in note 2).
9. 52 Fed Reg 3920 (1987). ."The Act's basic objective was to enhance the ability of
the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system."
USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 3 (cited in note 2). To achieve this object, Congress sought: (1) honesty
in sentencing (through the elimination of the parole system); (2) reasonable uniformity in
sentencing (by eliminating the wide disparity of sentences for similarly situated offenders);
and (3) proportionality in sentencing (through appropriately different sentences for criminal
conduct of differing severity). Id.
10. McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 312-13 n 35 (1987).
11. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 2 (cited in note 2).
12. Mistretta, 488 US at 363. "Statutes specified. the penalties for crimes but nearly
always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be
incarcerated and for how long, whether he should be fined and how much, and whether
some lesser restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine.
This indeterminate-sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by
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"unjustified" and "shameful" consequences: the great variation
among sentences upon similarly situated offenders and the uncer-
tainty as to the time the offender would spend in prison.13 Con-
gress concluded that the Guidelines would reduce sentence dispari-
ties yet retain the flexibility needed to adjust for unanticipated
factors arising in particular cases.
14
The Act states that punishment should serve retributive, educa-
tional, deterrent, and incapacitative goals, 5 but rejects imprison-
ment as an engine of rehabilitation."6 Furthermore, the Act consol-
idates the power of the sentencing judge and- the Parole
Commission in the Sentencing Commission, directs the Sentencing
Commission to devise guidelines (and general policy statements re-
garding the application of the Guidelines), and prospectively abol-
ishes the Parole Commission." Finally, the Act makes all sentences
generally determinate, subject to reductions for good behavior
while in custody. 8 Generally, the maximum of the sentencing
range for each category of offense may not exceed the minimum by
more than the greater of 25 percent or six months.' 9
Federal sentencing, historically, was distributed among the three
Branches of Government.2 ° The Commission, however, is estab-
lished "as an independent commission in the Judicial Branch of
the United States."' 2' Its duties include the promulgation, review
which an offender was returned to society under the 'guidance and control' of a parole of-
ficer." Id, citing Zerbst v Kidwell, 304 US 359, 363 (1938).
13. Mistretta, 488 US at 366.
14. Id at 367. The tension between uniformity and proportionality in sentencing was
minimized by creating a manageable (non-complex) set of guidelines and by limiting the
broad discretion of sentencing courts to select the appropriate point in an otherwise broad
sentencing range. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 3 (cited in note 2).
15. Mistretta, 488 US at 367 citing 18 USC § 3553(a)(2).
16. Mistretta, 488 US at 367 citing 28 USC § 994(k). The Act furthers the basic
purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment and rehabili-
tation. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 2 (cited in note 2). However, it is inappropriate to impose a
sentence for the purpose of rehabilitation, educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment. Mistretta, 488 US at 367, citing 28 USC § 994(k).
17. Mistretta, 488 US at 367 citing 28 USC §§ 991, 994 and 995(a)(1).
18. Mistretta, 488 US at 367 citing 18 USC § 3624(a-b).
19. 28 USC § 994(b)(2). However, if the minimum sentence is 30 years or greater,
then the maximum sentence may be life imprisonment. Id.
20. Mistretta, 488 US at 364. Under the indeterminate-sentencing system, Congress
defined the maximum sentence, the district judge imposed either probation or a sentence
within a statutory range, and a parole official of the Executive Branch eventually deter-
mined the actual duration of imprisonment. Id at 365.
21. Id at 368, citing 28 USC § 991(a). The hybrid structure and authority of the
Commission does not upset the balance of power between the Branches of Government.
Mistretta, 488 US at 412. In creating the Commission, Congress did not delegate excessive
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and revision of the Guidelines. The Commission also must issue
''general policy statements" regarding the application of the
Guidelines.23
The three goals of the Commission are to: (1) "assure the meet-
ing of the purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the Act;24 (2)
"provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentenc-
ing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences," where appropriate; and (3) "reflect, to
the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human be-
havior as it relates to the criminal justice process."2
Seven factors were considered by the Commission in the forma-
tion of the Guidelines' offense categories: (1) the grade of the of-
fense; (2) the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the crime;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense; (4)
the community view of the gravity of the crime; (5) the public con-
cern generated by the offense; (6) the deterrent effect that a partic-
ular sentence may have on others; and (7) the current incidence of
the offense. 6
Finally, Congress required that the Commission establish de-
fendant categories based upon eleven offender-related factors: (1)
age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; (4) mitigating or plainly
relevant mental and emotional conditions; (5) physical condition
(including drug or alcohol dependence or abuse); (6) previous em-
ployment record; (7) family ties and responsibilities; (8) commu-
nity ties; (9) role in the offense; (10) criminal history; and (11) de-
gree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.2 7
However, the Guidelines must "reflect the general inappropriate-
ness" of factors such as education, vocational skills, employment
record (including current unemployment), family ties and respon-
legislative power, but instead, constitutionally called "upon the accumulated wisdom and
experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of
judges." Id.
22. 28 USC § 994(o).
23. 28 USC § 994(a)(2). See, for example, USSG §§ 4A1.3, 5Hl.1-SH1.12, 5Kl.1,
5K2.0, 5K2.10-5K2.13, 5K2.16 ps (cited in note 4).
24. 28 USC § 991(b)(1)(A). The four purposes of sentencing include just punishment,
adequate deterrence of criminal conduct, protection of the public, and the provision for
necessary and effective correctional treatment. 18 USC § 3553(a)(2).
25. 28 USC § 991(b)(1)(B-C).
26. 28 USC § 994(c)(1-7).
27. 28 USC § 994(d)(1-11).
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sibilities, and community ties of the defendant.2" Moreover, the
Commission is prohibited from considering "race, sex, national ori-
gin, creed, [religion,] and socio[-]economic status of offenders. 29
III. THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines are defined as "the guidelines promulgated by
the Commission pursuant to [28 USC §] 994(a)."' 30 Furthermore,
the Commission has authority to promulgate both "guidelines,
'31
and "general policy statements regarding application of the guide-
lines."3 2 In determining whether a circumstance was adequately
considered by the Guidelines, a court must limit its review to the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary
of the Commission.33 Whenever "a policy statement prohibits a
district court from taking a specified action, the statement is an
authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable guideline.
'34
Nevertheless, policy statements are "interpretive guides to, not
substitutes for, the Guidelines themselves."35
The Guidelines include a sentencing table with 43 offense levels
on a vertical axis and six criminal history categories on a horizon-
tal axis. 6 This table defines 258 discrete sentencing ranges. Each
individual range overlaps with ranges in the preceding and suc-
ceeding levels. 7
28. 28 USC § 994(e). The Guidelines provide that these factors are "not ordinarily
relevant." See note 85 and accompanying text.
29. 28 USC § 994(d). The Commission has determined that the sentencing court can-
not consider certain specific factors as grounds for a departure: USSG § 5H1.4 (Policy State-
ment) (downward departures for drug or alcohol dependence or abuse), USSG § 5H1.10
(Policy Statement) (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion and socio-economic status),
USSG § 5H1.12 (Policy Statement) (lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances),
and USSG § 5K2.12 (Policy Statement) (personal financial difficulties and economic pres-
sures upon a trade or business). USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 4(b) (cited in note 2). However, other
factors, whether mentioned or not by the Guidelines, may be considered. Id.
30. 28 USC § 998(c). The Supreme Court has held that the Guidelines are constitu-
tional, and are neither an excessive delegation of legislative power nor a violation of the
separation of powers principle. Mistretta, 488 US at 412. See note 21.
31. 28 USC § 994(a)(1).
32. 28 USC § 994(a)(2).
33. 18 USC § 3553(b).
34. Williams, 112 S Ct at 1119.
35. United States v Johnson, 964 F2d 124, 127 (2d Cir 1992). "Even though policy
statements are numbered and grouped in the Guidelines Manual by means identical to ac-
tual guidelines, their purpose is limited to interpreting and explaining how to apply the
guidelines." Williams, 112 S Ct at 1125 (White, joined by Kennedy, dissenting) (citations
omitted).
36. USSG, Ch 5, Part A (cited in note 2).
37. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 4(h) (cited in note 2). In this manner, both the prosecution
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A. Departures from the Guidelines
Generally, the sentencing court must select a sentence from
within the guideline range.38 The Commission describes the Guide-
lines as "carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying
the conduct that each guideline describes.""9 A sentencing court
may, however, impose a sentence outside the presumptive range
established by the applicable guideline if the court finds "that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the guidelines."' 0 Various enu-
merated factors may also constitute a basis for departure: the vic-
tim's conduct, lesser harms (e.g., mercy killing), coercion and
duress, diminished capacity, and voluntary disclosure of the of-
fense.41 The application of other non-enumerated factors is left to
the discretion of the sentencing judge.42
"A sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of
each case would quickly become unworkable and seriously compro-
mise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent effect."4 s
"When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular
guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly dif-
fers from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is
warranted."44 However, whenever a court departs from the applica-
ble guideline range, the court must state the specific reasons for
and defense recognize that the difference between levels will not necessarily affect the im-
posed sentence. Thus, litigation is reduced. Id. Nevertheless, the levels aftow a sentence to
increase proportionally. A change of six levels will generally double the sentence regardless
of the starting level. Id.
38. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 2 (cited in note 2).
39. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 4(b) (cited in note 2).
40. 18 USC § 3553(b). Pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0 (Policy Statement), two avenues
may lead to a valid departure: (1) qualitative ("a district court may depart if it finds an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance 'of a kind' not considered by the Sentencing Com-
mission in formulating the guidelines"); and (2) quantitative ("a district court may depart if
it finds a material circumstance which, although considered by the Sentencing Commission,
is present 'to a degree' neither readily envisioned nor frequently seen in connection with the
offender and/or the offense of conviction"). United States v Sklar, 920 F2d 107, 115 (1st Cir
1990). However, regardless whether the departure is qualitative or quantitative, "the cir-
cumstance must have weight, that is, it must be sufficiently portentous to move the case out
of the heartland for the offense of conviction." Sklar, 920 F2d at 115 n 7.
41. See USSG §§ 5K2.10-5K2.13, 5K2.16 ps (cited in note 4).
42. United States v Lara, 905 F2d 599, 602 (2d Cir 1990). See USSG § 5K2.0 ps
(cited in note 4).
43. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 3 (cited in note 2).




A rigid, mechanized application which straitjackets a sentencing
court should be avoided.4 6 Furthermore, a court should not be
stripped of its "sensible flexibility" in considering departures.
4 7
The question of whether judges possess sufficient discretion to ad-
dress "atypical" cases and the related question of whether Con-
gress and the Commission have permitted virtually no judicial dis-
cretion remain unanswered:
Many of those who decry the emphasis on incarceration in the guidelines
complain that the system deprives judges of the discretion they need to sen-
tence non-violent offenders to sanctions other than imprisonment. In fact,
the Sentencing Reform Act provides significant latitude for departure, but
many judges consider themselves bound by the Commission's advice in the
Part 5H policy statements that certain offender characteristics are "not or-
dinarily relevant" to sentencing."8
This debate could be softened, but not entirely eliminated, by re-
cently proposed amendments to the Guidelines which would
broaden judicial discretion in three areas: (1) ordinarily irrelevant
offender characteristics which are both present to an unusual de-
gree and important for sentencing purposes; (2) the defendant's
age combined with a second, permissible factor (e.g., young and
naive or elderly and infirm); and (3) the lack of youthful guidance
or a history of family violence."9
B. Appellate Review
The Act provides for limited appellate review of sentences in or-
der to ensure the proper application of the Guidelines. ° A defend-
ant may appeal a sentence imposed in violation of law, or as a re-
sult of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, or if the district
45. 18 USC § 3553(c).
46. Lara, 905 F2d at 604.
47. United States v Sturgis, 869 F2d 54, 57 (2d Cir 1989). See United States v Lie-
berman, 971 F2d 989, 999 n 10 (3d Cir 1992) (emphasizing the importance of greater flexi-
bility and visible judicial discretion to advance the purposes of the Act).
48. Ronald Weich, Proposed 1992 Guideline Amendments, 4 Fed Sent Rptr 239
(1992).
49. 57 Fed Reg 90-01 (1992) (USSG, Ch 5, Part H, Departures, Item 33(A-C) (Pro-
posed Amendments) (cited in note 4)). But see 57 Fed Reg 20148-01 (1992) (Amendment,
USSG § 5H1.12 ps (cited in note 4)) (providing that: "Lack of guidance as a youth and
similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds for
imposing a sentence outside the applicable guideline range."); notes 185-86 and accompany-
ing text.
50. 18 USC § 3742.
1993
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court,departed upward from the guideline range. 1 Similarly, the
Government may appeal a sentence imposed in violation of law, or
as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, or if the
district court departed downward from the guideline range.
52
An incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines occurs
when a ground for departure, stated by the sentencing judge, is
prohibited either by the Guidelines or by the general policy state-
ments regarding the Guidelines' application. The Guidelines are
also incorrectly applied where the district court "depart[s] from
the applicable sentencing range based on a factor that the Com-
mission has already fully considered in establishing the guideline
range or ... expressly rejected as an appropriate ground for depar-
ture."54 Moreover, an appellate court may not affirm a sentence
solely on its independent assessment that the departure was rea-
sonable where the district court relied on an improper ground in
departing. from the guideline range. 5
Instead, the appellate court must make two separate inquiries. 6
First, was the sentence imposed "in violation of law or as a result
of an incorrect application of the Guidelines?"57 Second (if the de-
51. Williams, 112 S Ct at 1118 citing 18 USC § 3742(a).
52. Williams, 112 S Ct at 1118 citing 18 USC § 3742(b). The Supreme Court further
stated that Section 3742(f) defines the appellate court's narrow scope of review:
If the court of appeals determines that the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application
of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing
proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate;
(2) is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable or was imposed for
an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unrea-
sonable, it shall state specific reasons for its conclusions and-
(A) if it determines that the sentence is too high and the appeal has been filed
[by the defendant], it shall set aside the sentence and remand the case for
further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers
appropriate;
(B) if it determines that the sentence is too low and the appeal has been filed
[by the Government], it shall set aside the sentence and remand the case for
further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers
appropriate;
(3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), it shall affirm the sentence.
Williams, 112 S Ct at 1118-19, citing 18 USC § 3742(f).
53. Williams, 112 S Ct at 1118-20.
54. Id at 1119.
55. Id at 1120.
56. Id.
57. Id. If true, a remand is required by 18 USC § 3742(f)(1). However, a remand is
not required where "the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not
relied upon the invalid factor or factors." Williams, 112 S Ct at 1120. In other words, "a
remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that
parture was not a result of error in interpreting the Guidelines),
was "the resulting sentence an unreasonably high or low departure
from the relevant guideline range?"58
In reviewing a district court's departure on the basis of mitigat-
ing or aggravating circumstances, the appellate court utilizes a
three-part test. This three-part standard of review was first pro-
vided in United States v Diaz- Villafane 9 First, the appellate
court exercises plenary review and determines as a matter of law
"whether or not circumstances are of a kind or degree that ...
justify departure" through mitigating or aggravating circumstances
not adequately considered by the Commission.s° Next, under a
clearly erroneous standard, the court reviews the record and deter-
mines "whether the circumstances, if conceptually proper, actually
exist in the particular case" and have a basis- in fact."' Finally, the
actual sentence, in terms of "the direction and degree of depar-




Although the Commission recognizes that the Guidelines cannot
include "the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a
sentencing decision," it believes that given the legal freedom, sen-
tencing courts will infrequently depart from the Guidelines.13 In
this manner, the Guidelines and the assigned sentencing ranges ad-
dress the "heartland" of typical offenses, while departures are
''rare occurrences" and address "unusual cases outside the range of
the more typical offenses for which the guidelines were
designed."6 4 Departures may either be guided" or unguided.1 Re-
the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the
sentence imposed." Id at 1120-21, citing FRCrP 52(a).
58. Williams, 112 S Ct at 1120. If so, a remand is required under 18 USC §
3742(f)(2). Williams, 112 S Ct at 1120.
59. 874 F2d 43, 49-50 (lst Cir.1989).
60. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F2d at 49.
61. Id; see 18 USC § 3742(d).
62. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F2d at 49; see 18 USC § 3742(e)(2). See also United States v
Kikumura, 918 F2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir 1990) (expanding the third part of the standard to
determine whether the factors relied upon are appropriate bases for departure and whether
the degree of departure is reasonable).
63. USSG, Ch 1, Part A, 4(b) (cited in note 2). For example, physical injury is gener-
ally important in crimes of assault or robbery, but is rarely relevant in cases of fraud. How-
ever, in such a rare case, a departure would be proper. Id.
64. Id.
65. Guided departures include specific guidance for departure by numerical or non-
1993 Comments 369
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gardless of the type or direction, departure sentences extend be-
yond the fixed limits of the guideline ranges. To this end, the cu-
mulative downward departure jurisprudence has stretched the




When an offense level is extraordinarily magnified by a circum-
stance that bears little relation to the defendant's actual role in the
offense, a downward departure is warranted on the ground that
minimal participation exists to a degree not contemplated by the
Guidelines. 8 Also, where an adjustment for role in the offense is
not available by strict application of the language of the Guide-
lines, the court has the power to use analogic reasoning to depart
from the Guidelines when the basis for departure is similar
conduct.6 9
numerical suggestion or analogy. Id. For example, a downward departure of eight levels is
recommended for transportation for the purpose of prostitution or prohibited sexual con-
duct in the absence of commercial purpose and physical force or coercion. See USSG §
2G1.1, Commentary (cited in note 4).
66. Unguided departures are more infrequent and may rest on grounds listed in
Chapter Five, Part K or on other grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines. USSG, Ch 1,
Part A, 4(b) (cited in note 2). See notes 187-210 and accompanying text.
67. Section 3B1.2 of the USSG provides:
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, de-
crease by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease
by 2 levels.
In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.
USSG § 3B1.2 (cited in note 4).
68. United States v Restrepo, 936 F2d 661, 667 (2d Cir 1991). In this crime of money
laundering, the adjustment for the amount of cash associated with the offense resulted in an
increase of nine levels. However, the defendants were merely laborers whose sole function
was to load boxes of money at a warehouse on the night of the arrest. The defendants'
minimal participation existed to a degree not contemplated by the Guidelines and resulted
in a four-level downward departure. Restrepo, 936 F2d at 666-67. Compare United States v
Joyner, 924 F2d 454, 461 (2d Cir 1991) (rejecting a downward departure because only an
extraordinarily minute role deserves a departure beyond the four-level maximum reduction
of USSG § 3B1.2).
69. United States v Bierley, 922 F2d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir 1990). In this case, the de-
fendant procured pornographic material from an undercover postal inspector, rather than a
nationwide child pornography ring. Bierley, 922 F2d at 1063. However, the undercover agent
was not a criminally responsible "participant." Id at 1065. Although USSG § 3B1.2 linguisti-
cally did not apply to the defendant, because there was no criminally responsible "partici-
pant," the defendant's conduct was not significantly different from another defendant in
similar circumstances who might qualify for a role in the offense adjustment. Bierley, 922
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For example, in United States v Valdez-Gonzalez, the defend-
ants were mere drug "mules"7 and the sole participants in the of-
fense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.72 An ad-
justment for marginal culpability was not directly available. 73
Nevertheless, no provision of the Guidelines barred a downward
departure for marginal culpability by relatively blameless defend-
ants such as "mules" in drug trafficking.7' The role in the drug
trade played by "mules," therefore, constituted a mitigating cir-
cumstance of a kind or to a degree not considered by the
Guidelines.
7 5
2. Adequacy of Criminal History Score7 6
The USSG § 4A1.3 policy statement contemplates that the six
categories associated with the criminal history score may inade-
quately consider the variability in the severity of various defend-
ants' criminal history. 7 An instance of the exaggeration of the
F2d at 1068. Therefore, a downward departure was proper in this rare and unusual case
where there was "concerted activity" but only one "participant." Id at 1069. This departure
was limited to the extent of the most nearly analogic guideline-two to four levels on the
basis of USSG § 3B1.2. Bierley, 922 F2d at 1069.
70. 957 F2d 643 (9th Cir 1992).
71. "Mules" are drug couriers. See United States v Cacho, 951 F2d 308, 309 (11th Cir
1992).
72. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F2d at 647-48.
73. Id at 649.
74. Id.
75. Id at 650. A downward departure, from 41-51 months to eight months plus three
years of supervised release, based upon the defendants' role in conduct outside the scope of
the offense of conviction, was recognized in order to give effect to the Guidelines' intent,
where'the offense precluded a downward adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2. Valdez-Gonza-
lez, 957 F2d at 645, 649.
76. Section 4A1.3 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
There may be cases where the court concludes that a defendant's criminal history
category significantly over-represents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal his-
tory or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. An example
might include the case of a defendant with two minor misdemeanor convictions close
to ten years prior to the instant offense and no other evidence of prior criminal be-
havior in the intervening period. The court may conclude that the defendant's crimi-
nal history was significantly less serious than that of most defendants in the same
criminal history category . . . and therefore consider a downward departure from the
guidelines.
USSG § 4A1.3 ps (cited in note 4).
77. Id. The Guidelines clearly permit a downward departure where the defendant's
conduct is exaggerated by the criminal history score. Id. Moreover, where a district court
believes it does not have the discretion to consider mitigating factors relevant to a down-
ward departure, and authority exists, the case may be remanded with instructions that al-
low, but do not direct, the district judge to consider whether such a departure is warranted.
United States v Brown, 903 F2d 540, 545 (8th Cir 1990).
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criminal history score was United States v Bowser,78 where the
conjunction of three factors mitigated the seriousness of the de-
fendant's criminal history: (1) the defendant's two previous crimi-
nal acts were committed when he was merely 20 years old; (2) such
prior acts were committed within two months of each other; and
(3) the defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences.7 9 This
unique combination of criminal history factors was insufficiently
considered by the Guidelines and their conjunction permitted a
downward departure.8s The over-representation of the seriousness
of the criminal history score, was therefore, an appropriate consid-
eration for a downward departure.81
3. Specific Offender Characteristics
The specific offender policy statements address the relevance of
certain offender characteristics to sentence departures.82 The Com-
mission has determined that various factors are either relevant,
"not ordinarily relevant," or irrelevant in the determination of a
departure sentence.8 3
a. Age 4
Although age is "not ordinarily relevant," a district court may
78. 941 F2d 1019 (10th Cir 1991).
79. Bowser, 941 F2d at 1024. Under the Guidelines, the defendant's sentence could
have been nearly tripled by the career offender enhancement. Id at 1023.
80. Id at 1025. Similarly, in United States v Senior, 935 F2d 149 (8th Cir 1991), the
defendant's criminal history score was overstated because the state courts had treated the
defendant's three robberies, committed at age 20, "as more or less one criminal episode."
Senior, 935 F2d at 150-51. Moreover, such score was further exaggerated, because at age 24,
the defendant committed two drug-related offenses within 14 days. These crimes were con-
solidated for sentencing, the sentences were imposed concurrently, and parol was granted
after about 18 months. Thus, a downward departure from 292 months to the statutory mini-
mum sentence of ten years was reasonable. Id.
81. Bowser, 941 F2d at 1024; United States v Lawrence, 916 F2d 553, 554-55 (9th Cir
1990). See United States v Pinckney, 938 F2d 519, 521 (4th Cir 1991) (remanding for con-
sideration by district court); Brown, 903 F2d at 544-45 (same).
82. USSG, Ch 5, Part H, Intr Commentary (cited in note 2).
83. Id. However, consideration of other specific offender characteristics may be per-
mitted where a departure is firmly grounded in one or more of the penological goals (retri-
bution, general deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation) underlying the Guidelines.
United States v Mogel, 956 F2d 1555, 1558 n 2, 1562 (11th Cir 1992).
84. Section 5HL.1 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Age (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range. Age may be a reason to impose a
sentence below the applicable guideline range when the defendant is elderly and in-
firm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally
efficient as and less costly than incarceration ..
USSG § 5Hl.1 ps (cited in note 4).
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consider age "in an extraordinary case."85 However, in the arguably
atypical case of United States v Carey,"' the court of appeals
noted that a departure based on the combination of the defend-
ant's age, 62, and the fact that he had several serious operations as
a result of a brain tumor, without more particularized findings and
analysis pursuant to USSG §§ 5H1.1 and 5H1.4 (Policy State-
ments), was unreasonable.87 Age is, thus, generally considered in
combination with other factors."8
b. Education and Vocational Skills"'
Education and vocational skills are not ordinarily relevant in de-
termining whether a sentence should depart from the Guidelines'
range.9 ° Thus, in United States v Desormeaux,91 the defendant's
post-arrest conduct in advancing her education and attaining a
General Education Development High School Equivalency Certifi-
cate (GED) was deemed insufficiently extraordinary to warrant a
85. United States v Lopez, 938 F2d 1293, 1296 (DC Cir 1991). The policy statements
of USSG §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6 prohibit sentence range departures "in all but extraordinary
cases." Mogel, 956 F2d at 1562.
86. 895 F2d 318 (7th Cir 1990).
87. Carey, 895 F2d at 324.
88. For example, in Bowser, the court considered the defendant's 20-year age at the
time of previous criminal acts and permitted a downward departure because these acts over-
represented the severity of the defendant's criminal history. Bowser, 941 F2d at 1025. Age,
although not ordinarily relevant, has meaning when reviewing the circumstances of the
criminal history. Id at 1024.
Also, in United States v Garcia, No 90-30363, 952 F2d 408 (text in WL) (9th Cir Jan 6,
1992), the court departed downward based on factors in USSG §§ 5H1.1 and 5H1.6 (Policy
Statements). The defendant's family ties were unusually supportive and shielded the de-
fendant from gang-related influences. Moreover, the defendant's father, a minister, pro-
tected his son by ordering gang members to leave the family home. The defendant's parents
arranged for their son to live near relatives, away from gang influence, but in close contact
with his parents. In this case, the district court did not commit plain error in departing
downward because the defendant's youth, naivete and supportive family ties were excep-
tional. Garcia, 952 F2d 408 at 5-6.
89. Section 5H1.2 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Education and vocational skills are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, but the extent to which a
defendant may have misused special training or education to facilitate criminal activ-
ity is an express guideline factor. ...
Education and vocational skills may be relevant in determining the conditibns of pro-
bation or supervised release for rehabilitative purposes, for public protection by re-
stricting activities that allow for the utilization of a certain skill, or in determining
the appropriate type of community service.
USSG § 5H1.2 ps (cited in note 4).
90. Id.
91. 952 F2d 182 (8th Cir 1991).
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downward departure.2
c. Mental and Emotional Conditions
93
A defendant must either have extraordinary mental and emo-
tional conditions, or else have related factors, not adequately con-
sidered or substantially exceeding the ordinary, to justify a USSG
§ 5H1.3 (Policy Statement) downward departure. 4 A variety of
such conditions have been held to be improper for departures: non-
spousal physical and emotional abuse, 95 dependent personality dis-
order, 96 compulsive gambling, 97 the need for psychiatric treat-
ment,98 and suicidal tendencies. 99
The requirement for extraordinary mental and emotional cir-
cumstances, before a court may properly provide a downward de-
parture, has been identified by the courts. The defendant, in
United States v Vela, 0 ° was sexually abused by her stepfather as a
child. She alleged that this ordeal, and the denial of these events
by her mother, predisposed her to the distribution of heroin. 1'
The court of appeals reversed a downward departure because these
factors, though egregious, were insufficiently extraordinary, did not
92. Desormeaux, 952 F2d at 185-86 (holding that post-offense rehabilitative conduct
is the same as acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3El.l). See Sklar, 920 F2d at 115-
17 and note 201 (requiring extraordinary rehabilitation that is atypical of ordinary accept-
ance of responsibility).
93. Section 5H13 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether
a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, except as provided in
Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2....
Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining the conditions of
probation or supervised release .
USSG § 5H1.3 ps (cited in note 4).
94. United States v Studley, 907 F2d 254, 258 (1st Cir 1990) (reviewing a departure
based on the "risk to the community" factor). The defendant's mental or emotional condi-
tions are not ordinarily relevant, but if considered, the district court must expressly find
that the defendant's particular mental or emotional condition is "atypical." Studley, 907
F2d at 258. When such conditions do exist, the sentencing court possesses broad discretion
in determining that a downward departure may be warranted. Id.
95. Desormeaux, 952 F2d at 185.
96. United States v Russell, 917 F2d 512, 516-17 (11th Cir 1990) (holding that in
extraordinary instances, mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in mitigating a
defendant's culpability under USSG § 5K2.13 (Policy Statement), but then, only if the de-
fendant committed a nonviolent crime).
97. United States v Rosen, 896 F2d 789, 791 (3d Cir 1990).
98. See United States v Doering, 909 F2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir 1990) (vacating an
upward departure); 28 USC § 994(k).
99. United States v Harpst, 949 F2d 860, 863-64 (6th Cir 1991).
100. 927 F2d 197 (5th Cir 1991).
101. Vela, 927 F2d at 198.
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cause the defendant's criminal conduct, and were often present in
the lives of criminals.102 However, in dictum, the court stated that
an extraordinary family history of incest or related treatment, that
both caused an offender's mental or emotional conditions and af-
fected the subsequent criminal conduct, could be a proper ground
for a downward departure.1"3
A downward departure for mitigating emotional factors was pro-
vided in United States v Perez,"°4 where the 25-year old defendant
had been arrested for dealing in crack, gave birth while in custody,
and was forced to give the infant to relatives during her 15-month
period of incarceration awaiting trial. 05 Tragically, she exper-
ienced the sudden and unexpected death of this child. 06 Moreover,
the defendant was subject to deportation as an illegal alien after
release, and thus, would continue to be separated from family and
friends."0 7 A downward departure was authorized because this
emotional blow was a mitigating circumstance not adequately con-
sidered by the Guidelines. 08
102. Id at 199. The court stated that the defendant's factual justification was insuffi-
cient to support a downward departure. "Childhood abuse and neglect are often present in
the lives of criminals" and may cause mental and physical effects. Id. Although the defend-
ant's family life was "shocking and repulsive," her family background ivas not the cause of
her criminal conduct. Id.
103. Id. For example, crimes involving prostitution or child abuse, unlike the distribu-
tion of heroin, may have a sufficient nexus with an extraordinary family history of incest. In
contrast, United States v Roe, F2d , 1992 WL 252853 (9th Cir), departed downward
in a sentence for bank robbery and held that abuse as a child was a proper-basis for depar-
ture in extraordinary circumstances. Roe, 1992 WL 252853 at 2 (The psychological effects of
child abuse manifest themselves in profound mental or emotional conditions of inadequacy,
isolation, confusion, low self-esteem and guilt. Such conditions, in this case, affected the
defendant's criminal conduct in committing a bank robbery.).
104. 756 F Supp 698 (ED NY 1991).
105. Perez, 756 F Supp at 698-99.
106. Id at 698.
107. Id at 699.
108. Id at 698. "There are occasions where the law's implacability must bend and give
homage through compassion to humanity's frailties and nature's cruelties." Id.
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d. Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence
or Abuse"'
A defendant must have an' extraordinary,"' atypical or un-
usual11 physical condition, such as the "potential for victimiza-
tion" and "extreme vulnerability," under a proper USSG § 5H1.4
(Policy Statement) downward departure. 2 Ordinary, typical, or
usual physical conditions are inappropriate for such departures.
Conditions which the courts have found to be ordinary include:
pregnancy, 1  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),114
"poor health,"'1 5 drug dependence, 1  alcoholism,1  and participa-
tion in a post-arrest drug rehabilitation program."'
109. Section 5H1.4 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.
However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sen-
tence below the applicable guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm de-
fendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.
Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a reason for imposing a sentence below
the guidelines.
USSG § 5H1.4 ps (cited in note 4).
110. United States v Greenwood, 928 F2d 645, 646 (4th Cir 1991). The defendant was
severely handicapped by the loss of both legs below the knee due to action in the Korean
War and required specialized treatment at the Veterans Administration Hospital. A down-
ward departure was justified by these extraordinary medical problems where incarceration
would have jeopardized the defendant's required treatments. Greenwood, 928 F2d at 646.
111. See United States v Pozzy, 902 F2d 133, 138-39 (1st Cir 1990) (vacating a down-
ward departure because pregnancy was neither atypical nor unusual).
112. Lara, 905 F2d at 601, 605. This case involved an extraordinary situation where
the defendant was particularly vulnerable due to his immature appearance, bisexual orienta-
tion, diminutive size and fragility. Moreover, the severity of his prison term was exacerbated
by his placement in solitary confinement as the sole means of segregating him from other
inmates. These factors, ordinarily irrelevant, were properly considered in providing a down-
ward departure. Id at 601-03. See United States v Long, F2d , 1992 WL 293261 at 13
(8th Cir) (holding that an extraordinary physical impairment that results in extreme vulner-
ability is a legitimate basis for departure).
113. Pozzy, 902 F2d at 138-39.
114. United States v DePew, 751 F Supp 1195, 1199 (ED Va 1990), affd, 932 F2d 324
(4th Cir 1991).
115. United States v Guajardo, 950 F2d 203, 208-9 (5th Cir 1991) (the combination of
cancer in remission, high blood pressure, a fused right ankle, an amputated left leg and drug
dependency was not extraordinary).
116. United States v Anders, 956 F2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir 1992).
117. United States v Page, 922 F2d 534, 535-36 (9th Cir 1991).
118. United States v Martin, 938 F2d 162, 163-64 (9th Cir 1991) (holding that rehabil-
itation from drug abuse was not a proper ground for departure but could be considered in
post-sentence supervised release). Contrast United States v Harrington, 947 F2d 956, 958-
62 (DC Cir 1991) (holding that a post-offense, pretrial drug rehabilitation effort may justify
a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1). But see United
States v Maier, F2d , 1992 WL 233497 at 5 (2d Cir) (holding that neither USSG §§
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Extraordinary physical conditions were found in United States v
Gonzalez," 9 where the defendant was extremely small and femi-
nine in appearance. Although he was 19, he resembled a 14 or 15-
year old boy.12 0 Because his features would "make him prey to the
long-term criminals with whom he will be associated in prison," a
downward departure properly ensured the defendant's 9afety from
homophobic attacks because of his extreme vulnerability.
1 21
United States v Whitehorse1 1 2 is an unusual case involving the
totality of all of the circumstances. The defendant's previous treat-
ment in prison for alcoholism failed because the prison officials
made an ill-advised decision to send the defendant on an un-
supervised furlough .1 23 The defendant was intoxicated throughout
the furlough, failed to return to prison on time, and was charged
with an "escape. '124 Thus, the district court wanted the defendant
supervised by a United States probation officer, but not by the Bu-
reau of Prisons, during her subsequent treatment for alcohol ad-
diction.12' The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion where
the district court implemented alcoholism-treatment, by way of
sentencing, to provide needed education or vocational training,
medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.12
6
5H1.4 nor 3E1.1 discloses the Commission's adequate consideration of drug rehabilitation,
which may warrant departure in an appropriate case).
119. 945 F2d 525 (2d Cir 1991).
120. Gonzalez, 945 F2d at 526.
121. Id at 525-26. Unlike Lara, which involved a victimized, bisexual defendant, the
present defendant, who was neither gay nor bisexual, need not have already been victimized
as a prerequisite to a downward departure under the Guidelines. Id at 526-27. Prison vio-
lence may be prevented before it occurs based on the recognition that "prison conditions
may be particularly oppressive to vulnerable individuals." Id at 527.
The district court based its decision to depart downward on Lara which held that extreme
vulnerability was inadequately considered by the Commission. Id at 525-26. Thus, the court
of appeals applied a clearly erroneous standard of review to the district court's findings of
fact. Id at 526. In contrast, in Lara, the original legal question regarding extreme vulnerabil-
ity was reviewed de novo. Id at 526 n 1.
The dissent, nevertheless, objected because the findings of fact merely demonstrated a
defendant of less than average height and weight. Gonzalez, 945 F2d at 528 n 1 (Winter
dissenting). "The number of defendants eligible for a downward departure on [the ground of
fear of assaults] is thus virtually unlimited, and the Guidelines' goal of uniformity will be
thoroughly subverted." Id at 529.
122. 909 F2d 316 (8th Cir 1990).
123. Whitehorse, 909 F2d at 319.
124. Id at 318-19.
125. Id.
126. Id at 319-20. A downward departure from 12-18 months to four months, concur-
rent with a preVious assault sentence, was appropriate. Id at 317.
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Section 5H1.4 (Policy Statement) of the USSG does not require
that a physical condition only be pertinent to the question of im-
prisonment. Instead, § 5H1.4 permits downward departures when-
ever there is sufficient evidence of impairment. 2 7 The district
court must make a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the factual find-
ings indicate that the physical and mental disabilities are ex-
traordinary impairments; and (2) whether the condition of disabil-
ity requires a reduced term of imprisonment or an alternative to
confinement. 2 '
e. Employment Record'29
In the absence of sufficiently unusual circumstances associated
with a defendant's employment record, a downward departure pur-
suant to USSG § 5H1.5 (Policy Statement) is improper. 3 ° Employ-
ment records involving a steady and successful employment'' or a
commendable military service"' are usual and ordinary, and there-
fore, are improper circumstances for such departures. A defend-
ant's employment record supports a downward departure only in
exceptional or extraordinary cases.'
3
3
The defendant, in United States v Big Crow, 34 had an excellent
127. United States v Ghannam, 899 F2d 327, 329 (4th Cir 1990) (holding that suffi-
cient evidence of impairment may justify various departure sentences: either a greater de-
parture of no imprisonment or a lesser departure of merely shorter imprisonment).
128. United States v Slater, 971 F2d 626, 634-35 (10th Cir 1992) (remanding to the
district court for a two-step determination of whether disabling back pain, inability to work,
severe headaches, chronic major depressive disorder and borderline mental retardation were
extraordinary impairments that required a reduced term or an alternate form of
confinement).
129. Section 5H1.5 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range.
Employment record may be relevant in determining the conditions of probation or
supervised release ....
USSG § 5H1.5 ps (cited in note 4).
130. United States v Rushby, 936 F2d 41, 43 (1st Cir 1991).
131. Rushby, 936 F2d at 41-42 (holding that ownership of a painting and wallpaper-
hanging business that earned $30,000 per year over ten years was not unusual).
132. United States v Neil, 903 F2d 564, 565-66 (8th Cir 1990) (stating that downward
departures are "quite rare" and holding that eleven years of commendable military service,
as a recruiter in the continental United States, was insufficiently unusual).
133. United States v Jagmohan, 909 F2d 61, 65 (2d Cir 1990). The defendant was
gainfully employed for nine years after he entered the United States. He was convicted of
bribery in an unusual offense, where he used a personal check in the illicit transaction.
These exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, which reflected a lack of sophistication
in committing the offense, justified the downward departure from 15-21 months to three
years of probation plus a $4,000 fine. Jagmohan, 909 F2d at 63, 65.
134. 898 F2d 1326 (8th Cir 1990).
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employment record, a solid community reputation and made con-
sistent efforts to overcome the adverse environment of an Indian
reservation, where the unemployment rate was 72 percent and the
per capita income was only $1042.' 35 The defendant's employer
valued his work and was willing to hold his job until his release
from custody.13'6 These mitigating factors were not adequately con-
sidered by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines and jus-
tified a downward departure.'37
f. Family Ties and Responsibilities, and Community Ties' 38
In the absence of unique or extraordinary circumstances involv-
ing family or community, a downward departure under USSG
§ 5H1.6 (Policy Statement) is inappropriate.139 Examples of non-
extraordinary family circumstances, not warranting departure, in-
clude the defendant's: status as a single parent,'"" efforts to keep
his family together,' 4 ' status as a parent of several children,'4 two
minor children being separated and placed with "blood stran-
gers,"' 3 status as parent of a handicapped child,' spouse was also
imprisoned,' 5 unpleasant childhood and family life,'46 and wife's
affair with the victim.' 4 7 An example of non-extraordinary commu-
135. Big Crow, 898 F2d at 1331-32.
136. Id at 1332.
137. Id at 1331. The 23-year old defendant's "excellent employment history, solid
community ties, and consistent efforts to lead a decent life in a difficult environment" were
sufficiently unusual grounds to justify a departure. Id at 1332.
138. Section 5H1.6 (Policy Statement) provides:
Family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.
Family responsibilities that are complied with may be relevant to the determination
of the amount of restitution or fine.
USSG § 5H1.6 ps (cited in note 4).
139. Cacho, 951 F2d at 311. Only extraordinary family circumstances, that are outside
"'the heartland' of cases" the Guidelines were intended to cover, can be the basis for a
downward departure. United States v Shortt, 919 F2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir 1990).
140. United States v Harrison, 970 F2d 444, 447-48 (8th Cir 1992); United States v
Chestna, 962 F2d 103, 107 (1st Cir 1992); Mogel, 956 F2d at 1565; United States v Headley,
923 F2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir 1991); United States v Johnson, 908 F2d 396, 399 (8th Cir
1990).
141. United States v Berlier, 948 F2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir 1991).
142. Cacho, 951 F2d at 310-11 (mother of four small children); Headley, 923 F2d at
1082-83 (parent of five minor children).
143. United States v Brand, 907 F2d 31, 33 (4th Cir 1990).
144. United States v Fiterman, 732 F Supp 878, 880, 885 (ND Ill 1989).
145. Pozzy, 902 F2d at 139.
146. Anders, 956 F2d at 913.
147. Shortt, 919 F2d at 1328 ("adultery does not justify blowing up the adulterers, or
building a [pipe] bomb capable of doing so").
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nity ties, not warranting a departure, are the defendant's contribu-
tions to his town through his company."4 8
However, in United States v Pena,49 the defendant's criminal
behavior, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, was a
deviation from her usual conduct. 150 The defendant was a single
parent who provided the sole support for her two-month old child,
was steadily employed for a long time, and provided financial sup-
port for her 16-year old daughter, who was also a single parent of a
two-month old child. Extended incarceration would have placed
the two infants at potential risk. 5 ' The defendant's responsibilities
combined with the aberrational nature of her conduct created ex-
traordinary circumstances.' 52
Extraordinary circumstances have also been found where: the
stability of a close-knit family depended upon the defendant's
presence, '  a child's exceptionally 'promising future was
threatened,"' the family ties were unusually supportive and
shielded the young defendant from gang-related influences, 5 5 the
defendant had extraordinary parental responsibilities,' 6 there was
148. United States v McHan, 920 F2d 244, 248 (4th Cir 1990).
149. 930 F2d 1486 (10th Cir 1991).
150. Pena, 930 F2d at 1489, 1495.
151. Id at 1494.
152. Id at 1495. The court departed downward from 27-33 months to a five-year term
of probation with six months confinement in a community treatment center. Id at 1489.
153. United States v Alba, 933 F2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir 1991). Incarceration under the
Guidelines could destroy an otherwise strong family unit where the defendant was married
for twelve years and worked hard at two jobs in a long-standing employment. A downward
departure maintained the economic well-being of the defendant's family, which consisted of
his wife, two young children, disabled father, and paternal grandmother. The stability of
this close-knit family depended upon the defendant's presence. These circumstances were
sufficiently extraordinary to support such a departure. Alba, 933 F2d at 1122.
154. United States v Handy, 752 F Supp 561, 564 (ED NY 1990). The defendant was
orphaned in her teens, was the mother of three out-of-wedlock children who lived with her,
was gainfully employed for the past' thirteen years, supported her children without public
assistance, cared for the two small children of her boyfriend, and successfully guided her
children through a "socio-economic minefield." Handy, 752 F Supp at 561-62. These specific
circumstances merited a downward departure and were extraordinary in the areas of the
defendant's employment record, family ties and responsibility, and community ties. More-
over, a prolonged incarceration would have threatened the exceptionally promising future of
her two older children. Id at 564.
155. Garcia, 952 F2d 408 at 5-6. See note 88.
156. Johnson, 964 F2d at 129. The defendant's parental responsibilities were ex-
traordinary where she was solely responsible for the upbringing of her three young children,
including an infant, as well as the young child' of her institutionalized daughter. Id. How-
ever, this downward departure was not provided on behalf of the defendant, but instead, on
behalf of her family. Id at 129-30.
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a youthful lack of guidance,' and the community would be de-
prived of the services of "an exemplary citizen."' 8
g. Role in the Offense
59
Downward departures are indirectly granted pursuant to USSG
§ 5H1.7 (Policy Statement), which provides that the "defendant's
role in the -offense is relevant in determining the appropriate sen-
tence."' 6 ° Generally, however, these departures are provided under
USSG § 3B1.2 on the basis of the defendant's mitigating role as a
minor or minimal participant in concerted activity. 6'
h. Criminal History
6 2
Although criminal history is relevant, a defendant's first-time of-
fender status cannot justify a downward departure because such
status was already accounted for in the Guidelines.'63
i. Dependence upon Criminal Activity for a Livelihood
1 64
A downward departure on the basis of business ownership, inso-
157. United States v Floyd, 945 F2d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir 1991), amended, 956 F2d 203
(1992). The defendant was abandoned by his parents, imprisoned at age 17, and lacked
guidance and education. Floyd, 945 F2d at 1098. The district court did not err in departing
downward based upon youthful lack of guidance which clearly constituted "information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant" summarized by USSG §
1B1.4 but not prohibited by any provision of the Guidelines. Floyd, 945 F2d at 1102. In this
case, a downward departure from 360 months to life imprisonment down to 194 months was
appropriate. Id. But see note 49 and USSG § 5H1.12 ps (cited in note 4) (lack of guidance as
a youth is not relevant for departure).
158. United States v Turner, No 90-1277, 915 F2d 1574 (text in WL) (6th Cir Oct 5,
1990). The defendant was "an exemplary citizen" whose community and civic activities were
"substantially in excess" of most individuals, regardless of their criminal history. Turner,
915 F2d 1574 at 11. Such exceptional community involvement, reflected by participation in
various community organizations and service on many community boards over 30 years, was
not adequately taken into consideration by the Guidelines. Id at 6. Because other means of
punishment were available, a downward departure from 15-21 months to three years proba-
tion was appropriate in order not to deprive the community of the defendant's service. Id at
4-5, 11-12.
159. Section 5H1.7 (Policy Statement) provides: "A defendant's role in the offense is
relevant in determining the appropriate sentence. See Chapter Three, Part B (Role in the
Offense)." USSG § 5H1.7 ps (cited in note 4).
160. Id.
161. See note 67 and sub-section 1 (Mitigating Role) regarding USSG § 3B1.2.
162. Section 5H1.8 (Policy Statement) provides: "A defendant's criminal history is rel-
evant in determining the appropriate sentence. See Chapter Four (Criminal History and
Criminal Livelihood)." USSG § 5H1.8 ps (cited in note 4).
163. Neil, 903 F2d at 566; Big Crow, 898 F2d at 1331. See note 76 and sub-section 2
(Adequacy of Criminal History Score) regarding USSG § 4A1.3 (Policy Statement).
164. Section 5H1.9 (Policy Statement) provides: "The degree to which a defendant
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far as such ownership indicates a lack of dependence upon criminal
activity for a livelihood, is unwarranted. 16 5 Unlike upward depar-
tures, downward departures are generally not provided under
USSG § 5H1.9 (Policy Statement).
j. Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion and Socio-
Economic Status"'6
The factors of USSG § 5H1.10 (Policy Statement) are expressly
prohibited for use in the determination of sentences. ' The follow-
ing circumstances are also improper for the justification of a down-
ward departure: defendant unable to speak English,168 alien de-
fendant,'6 9  consideration of political circumstances,' 7 °  or
defendant's affluence. 7' However, mere admonitions or observa-
tions by the district judge, unrelated to socio-economic status, re-
garding the defendant's background and character,'72 the particu-
lars of his individual life,' 73 or exposure to domestic violence' 74 are
not barred.
In apparent conflict with the USSG § 5H1.10 policy statement,
Big Crow held that a downward departure was appropriate in light
of the defendant's excellent employment record, solid community
reputation and consistent efforts to overcome the adverse environ-
ment of an Indian reservation.17 These mitigating factors, in light
depends upon criminal activity for a livelihood is relevant in determining the appropriate
sentence .. " USSG § 5H1.9 ps (cited in note 4).
165. Mogel, 956 F2d at 1564.
166. Section 5H1.10 (Policy Statement) provides: "These factors are not relevant in
the determination of a sentence." USSG § 5H1.10 ps (cited in note 4).
167. Id.
168. United States v Rodriguez, 882 F2d 1059, 1066 (6th Cir 1989).
169. United States v Onwuemene, 933 F2d 650, 651-52 (8th Cir 1991).
170. See United States v Williams, 937 F2d 979, 981-82 (5th Cir 1991) (vacating an
upward departure on other grounds and stating that the sentencing judge's statements re-
garding the defendant's father's political rhetoric were "mere observations" and not "actual
considerations" in sentencing).
171. See United States v Graham, 946 F2d 19, 20-22 (4th Cir 1991) (vacating an up-
ward departure).
172. United States v Hatchett, 741 F Supp 622, 623-25 (WD Tex 1990), aft'd, 952 F2d
400 (5th Cir 1992) (a judge's "lecture" of the defendant during sentencing serves the goals of
initiating rehabilitation as well as promoting deterrence "by giving notice that no one is
above the law").
173. Lopez, 938 F2d at 1297-99 (exposure to domestic violence and its accompanying
dislocations is not a component of socio-economic status, which merely encompasses the
defendant's status in society as objectively determined by his education, income and
employment).
174. Id at 1298 (socio-economic status does not encompass domestic violence).
175. Big Crow, 898 F2d at 1331. See notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
Comments
of the adverse environment, were not adequately considered by the
Commission in formulating the Guidelines.17 Thus, excellent em-
ployment record and community reputation were the'basis of the
departure, but not race, national origin or socio-economic status. 7
k. Military, Civic, Charitable, or Public Service; Employment-
Related Contributions; Record of Prior Good Works1
78
Absent extraordinary circumstances involving public service, em-
ployment-related contributions, or similar prior good works, a
downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5H1.11 (Policy State-
ment) is improper. However, in United States v Takai,1 9 the de-
fendants, who engaged in single aberrant acts 8 ' and were not
"professional criminals," were only motivated by misguided benev-
olent desires to help three members of their community obtain
green cards.' The defendants had bribed a government official,
who was neither an undercover agent nor an informant. The offi-
cial had not discouraged their actions.' 82 Examining the totality of
the circumstances, the court of appeals found that downward de-
partures of one point were reasonable where the offenses were not
176. Big Crow, 898.F2d at 1331. "Although departure on the basis of socio[-]economic
factors is generally impermissible, courts can look to socio[-]economic conditions in deter-
mining whether an otherwise permissible factor presents a sufficiently atypical situation to
form a basis for departure. . . . The Big Crow court specifically found that the defendant's
employment history in such 'a difficult environment' was 'sufficiently unusual to constitute
grounds for a departure.' . . . It is the former factor which permits us to view the latter."
Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F2d at 649 n 3 (citations omitted)..
177. See id. Nevertheless, per the Senate Judiciary Committee's report, "[t]he require-
ment of neutrality ...is not a requirement of blindness" toward race, sex, national origin,
creed and socio-economic status. United States v Yu, 954 F2d 951, 958 n 3 (3d Cir 1992);
Big Crow, 898 F2d at 1332 n 3. However, the Guidelines do not permit reliance upon legisla-
tive history. See 18 USC § 3553(b) ("In determining whether a circumstance was adequately
taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.").
178. Section 5H1.11 (Policy Statement) provides:
Military, civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; and
similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sen-
tence should be outside the applicable guideline range.
USSG § 5H1.11 ps (cited in note 4).
179. 941 F2d 738 (9th Cir 1991).
180. A single act of truly aberrant behavior is a mitigating circumstance, not consid-
ered by the Commission, which warrants a downward departure United States v Fair-
less, F2d , 1992 WL 228473 at 6 (9th Cir) (finding aberrant behavior based on the
totality of the circumstances); United States v Morales, 961 F2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir 1992);
United States v Dickey, 924 F2d 836, 838 (9th Cir 1991) ("aberrant behavior" is not the
same as "first offense"); United States v Russell, 870 F2d 18, 20 (1st Cir 1989).
181. Takai, 941 F2d at 742-44.
182. Id at 744.
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for profit and did not involve coercion.183 The court further stated,
regarding prior good works, that "if Mother Teresa were accused of
illegally attempting to buy a green card for one of her sisters, it
would be proper for a court to consider her saintly deeds in mitiga-
tion of her sentence.
184
I. Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Circumstances'
Effective November 1, 1992, the Commission promulgated the
new USSG § 5H1.12 policy statement which provides that lack of
youthful guidance and the circumstances surrounding a disadvan-
taged upbringing are irrelevant grounds for any departure.'
4. Substantial Assistance to Authorities
1 8
1
In general, only the Government may move for a downward de-
parture based upon the defendant's substantial assistance.' The
Guidelines provide the Government with the power, but not the
duty, to file a substantial assistance motion.' District courts do,
however, have the authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file
such motion and grant a remedy if the refusal was based on an
unconstitutional motive, such as consideration of the defendant's
race or religion. 90 In addition, the court may inquire whether the
Government exercised bad faith in performing its duties under a
183. Id at 743.
184. Id at 744.
185. Section 5H1.12 (Policy Statement) provides:
Lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged
upbringing are not relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the applicable
guideline range.
USSG § 5H1.12 (Policy Statement) (cited in note 4).
186. Id.
187. Section 5K1.1 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosechtion of another person who has committed
an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines .
USSG § 5Kl.1 ps (cited in note 4).
188. Wade v United States, 112 S Ct 1840, 1843 (1992); United States v Higgins, 967
F2d 841, 843 (3d Cir 1992). The Government's motion must be express and may not be
implied or ambiguous. United States v Coleman, 895 F2d 501, 506 (8th Cir 1990).
189. Wade, 112 S Ct at 1843.
190. Id at 1843-44. Moreover, the sentencing court has the discretion and authority to
depart below the Government's recommendation. United States v Udo, 963 F2d 1318, 1319
(9th Cir 1992). However, because the Guidelines permit consideration of the "significance
and usefulness" of the defendant's assistance, the court, in its discretion, may temper the
extent of departure where such assistance was "unhelpful" to the Government. United
States v Spiropoulos, F2d , 1992 WL 235331 at 5-6 (3d Cir).
384
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plea bargain agreement.'91 Moreover, USSG § 5K1.1 (Policy State-
ment) merely focuses on the assistance that the defendant provides
to the Government, rather than his aid, if any, to the judicial
system.'92
5. Grounds for Departure'
93
Mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Commission may justify a
downward departure.' 4 Several mitigating factors, considered in
United States v Rogers,'96 included the career offender's: (1)
prompt surrender after committing a robbery; (2) full confession
and cooperation with authorities; (3) acknowledgment that crack
addiction was a contributing factor; and (4) acknowledgment that
imprisonment and rehabilitation were appropriate.' 6 These fac-
tors, in the discretion of the trial court, thus may provide an ap-
propriate basis for a downward departure. '97
Various courts have held that the following factors were inade-
quately considered by the Commission: voluntary (albeit late) sur-
render and acceptance of responsibility,' 98 extraordinary accept-
191. United States v Knights, 968 F2d 1483, 1489 (2d Cir 1992).
192. United States v Garcia, 926 F2d 125, 128 (2d Cir 1991). The defendant not only
helped the Government develop the case, but his cooperation after the indictment resulted
in the disposition of the charges against his two co-defendants. A downward departure was
not precluded when the defendant's "activities facilitating the proper administration of jus-
tice" in the district court were not encompassed by USSG § 5Kl.1 (Policy Statement). Gar-
cia, 926 F2d at 128.
193. Section 5K2.0 (Policy Statement) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Under 18 [USC] § 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the
range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds "that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating fhe guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described." . . .
Where, for example, the applicable offense guideline and adjustments do take into
consideration a factor listed in this subpart, departure from the applicable guideline
range is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of
that which ordinarily is involved in the offense.
USSG § 5K2.0 ps (cited in note 4).
194. Id.
195. 972 F2d 489 (2d Cir 1992).
196. Rogers, 972 F2d at 492.
197. Id at 493.
198. United States v Crumb, 902 F2d 1337, 1340 (8th Cir 1990). The defendant vio-
lated probation, was ordered to surrender for service of sentence, but failed to report to the
correctional institution on time. However, he voluntarily presented himself at such institu-
tion within nine days after a warrant for his arrest was issued. The district court provided a
downward departure beyond a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Crumb,
902 F2d at 1338-39. This departure was reasonable where the defendant's prompt surrender
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ance of responsibility,199 details of defendant's criminal career, 00
extraordinary rehabilitation,20 ' and money laundering promoting
de minimis °2 drug trafficking. 03
6. Additional Grounds for Departure
Additional grounds for downward departures are also considered
by the Guidelines and the courts: conduct of the victim,0 4 lesser
was not adequately accounted for by USSG § 2J1.6. This guideline did not address the
widely varying time lapses possible in a voluntary surrender. Crumb, 902 F2d at 1339-40.
199. Uzited States v Mickens, 926 F2d 1323, 1332 (2d Cir 1991). A "defendant who
realizes his wrongdoing and acts quickly to accept culpability for his crime may deserve
more favorable treatment than one who only agrees to plead guilty in the face of a forcible
arrest and federal prosecution." Rogers, 972 F2d at 493 citing Mickens, 926 F2d at 1332. See
Lieberman, 971 F2d at 996.
200. United States v Smith, 909 F2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir 1990). The relatively minor
nature of the defendant's two previous crimes within a two-month period (burglary of per-
sonal property resulting in a $1000 loss and twice selling LSD to an undercover agent for
$40), the briefness of his criminal career, and his age when the crimes were committed, one
year above the 18-year threshold, made this an unusual case. The defendant was sentenced
to 20 years for possessing and conspiring to sell cocaine, yet the applicable sentencing range
was between 24 years, four months and 30 years, five months. A downward departure was
justified because the factors that made the defendant a career offender were barely present
and "the Government [was] splitting hairs" in seeking resentencing. Smith, 909 F2d at
1169-70. See note 76 and sub-section 2 (Adequacy of Criminal History Score) regarding
USSG § 4A1.3 (Policy Statement).
201. Sklar, 920 F2d at 116. Rehabilitation may, on rare occasion, justify a downward
departure, "but only when and if the rehabilitation is 'so extraordinary as to suggest its
presence to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the acceptance of responsi-
bility reduction.' " Id, quoting Studley, 907 F2d at 259. In Sklar, however, the defendant's
rehabilitation after arrest and indictment, including entry in a detoxification program, absti-
nence from drug use, and acquisition of suitable employment, was solely based on the man-
dates of his pretrial release program. Because the defendant's rehabilitation was "insuffi-
ciently out of the ordinary" the downward departure was improper. Sklar, 920 F2d at 117.
202. Under the de minimis doctrine (de minimis non curat lex), "[t]he law does not
care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters." Black's Law Dictionary 431 (West,
6th ed 1990).
203. United States v Skinner, 946 F2d 176, 179 (2d Cir 1991). The defendants entered
a financial transaction with the intent to promote a narcotics trafficking conspiracy, but not
to conceal a serious crime. They were charged with the crime of money laundering. Where
such transaction was not intended to conceal a serious crime, but was de minimis and well
beyond the "heartland" or the "norm," because it merely represented the completion of a
sale between the defendants, the district court was empowered to consider a downward de-
parture for mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately considered by
the Guidelines. Skinner, 946 F2d at 179.
204. USSG § 5K2.10 ps (cited in note 4) ("If the victim's wrongful conduct contrib-
uted significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence be-
low the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense."). For exam-
ple, in United States v Yellow Earrings, 891 F2d 650 (8th Cir 1989), the defendant was
convicted of assault for stabbing the victim in his chest with a nine-inch bread knife and
inflicting serious injury. The crime occurred after the defendant refused to have sexual in-
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harms,"' coercion and duress,206 diminished capacity,20 7 voluntary
tercourse with the victim, who was six to eight inches taller and probably much stronger
than the defendant. The victim's conduct was historically unpredictable when, as in this
circumstance, he had been drinking. After being rejected, the victim became verbally abu-
sive, pushed the defendant, went to the doorway of his kitchen, stood nude, and began
shouting to the defendant's friends that she should be removed from his bedroom. Yellow
Earrings, 891 F2d at 651-54. In this case, the district court's downward departure was rea-
sonable in light of the victim's private abusive words, physical show of force, and public
denigration of the defendant. Id at 654.
205. USSG § 5K2.11 ps (cited in note 4) ("Sometimes, a defendant may commit a
crime in order to avoid a perceived greater harm. In such instances, a reduced sentence may
be appropriate, provided that the circumstances significantly diminish society's interest in
punishing the conduct, for example, in the case of a mercy killing .... In other instances,
conduct may not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
proscribing the offense at issue. For example, where a war veteran possessed a machine gun
. . . as a trophy .... "). See United States v Saldana, No 88-00196, 1989 WL 61140 at 3
(M D Pa May 19, 1989) (justifying a downward departure where an illiterate foreign defend-
ant reasonably believed he must escape from prison to avoid indefinite incarceration). Com-
pare United States v Napoli, 954 F2d 482, 483 (8th Cir 1992) (The defendant's unreasona-
ble intent to possess a sawed-off shotgun as a collector's item did not justify a downward
departure. However, a reduction in sentence was possible under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(1) for
possessing a firearm for collection.).
206. USSG § 5K2.12 ps (cited in note 4) ("If the defendant committed the offense
because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a
complete defense, the court may decrease the sentence below the applicable guideline
range."). In some cases, coercion may not amount to a complete defense because of the
absence of certain elements. Nevertheless, where the defendant is convicted beyond a rea-
sonable doubt because of wilful actions, the district court may depart downward where the
mitigating factor of coercion or duress is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Such
proof of coercion under the Guidelines does not require the traditional elements of immedi-
acy or inability to escape, nor does it limit the feared injury to bodily harm. United States v
Cheape, 889 F2d 477, 480 (3d Cir 1989).
207. USSG § 5K2.13 ps (cited in note 4) ("If the defendant committed a non-violent
offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from volun-
tary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the
extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, pro-
vided that the defendant's criminal history [score] does not indicate a need for incarceration
to protect the public."). The express language of the policy statement does not require proof
amounting to "but for" causation. United States v Ruklick, 919 F2d 95, 96-98 (8th Cir 1990)
(A downward departure was proper where the defendant had a diminished mental capacity
and functioned as a twelve-year old. This resulted from emotional difficulties that stemmed
from a childhood illness and comprised a contributing factor in the commission of a criminal
offense.).
The reduced capacity must significantly contribute to the defendant's actions. United
States v Glick, 946 F2d 335, 336, 339 (4th Cir 1991) (The defendant suffered from a signifi-
cantly reduced mental capacity, not caused by drugs or intoxicants, and "some possible loss
of contact with reality" which "led him to act out in [a] self destructive fashion" at the time
he committed the offense of interstate transportation of stolen property.). However, down-
ward departures under USSG § 5K2.13 (Policy Statement) are only available if the defend-
ant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental ca-
pacity. United States v Rodriguez, 938 F2d 319, 320 n 1 (1st Cir 1991).
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disclosure of the offense,"' certain limited cases of co-defendant
disparity,2"' and impressive rehabilitation.210
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It has been stated that sentencing is more of an art than an ex-
act science.2 ' After the Commission promulgated the Guidelines,
numerous judges, experienced in the art of indeterminate-sentenc-
ing, lamented the reduction of judicial discretion and the rigid
sentences required by the Guidelines.212 Some of these judges may
have been somewhat unfamiliar with the limits of the newly estab-
lished "heartland." Other judges refused to depart downward, even
in unusual cases, because the specific offender characteristics, as
defined by the policy statements, were not ordinarily relevant.
However, many right-thinking judges knew the outside of the de-
parture envelope and stretched its limits.213
208. USSG § 5K2.16 ps (cited in note 4) ("If the defendant voluntarily discloses to
authorities the existence of, and accepts responsibility for, the offense prior to the discovery
of such offense, and if such offense was unlikely to have been discovered otherwise, a depar-
ture below the applicable guideline range for that offense may be warranted.").
209. See United States v Ray, 930 F2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir 1990, amended, 1991)
(In the unique situation where one defendant is sentenced under the Guidelines while the
other co-defendants are sentenced under a different legal regime, such as when the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit temporarily refused to follow the Guidelines, the district
court may find "highly unusual" circumstances that support a downward departure.). Simi-
larly, a departure may be permissible where some conspiracy co-defendants pled guilty to
pre-Guidelines offenses and others were sentenced at trial under the Guidelines. United
States v Boshell, 952 F2d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir 1991).
However, downward departures to equalize sentences are generally unreasonable in the
absence of substantial factual differences between the co-defendants and their relative levels
of cooperation. United States v Nelson, 918 F2d 1268, 1274-75 (6th Cir 1990). In addition,
courts may not depart from the Guidelines on the basis of disparities between state and
federal sentencing regimes. United States v Sitton, 968 F2d 947, 962 (9th Cir 1992).
210. United States v Rodriguez, 724 F Supp 1118, 1119 (SD NY 1989). The defendant
was an addict at the time of the criminal act and lived apart from his wife and children.
However, after his arrest, he accomplished an impressive rehabilitation, overcame his addic-
tion, remained drug-free for almost two years, was reunited with his wife and children, ob-
tained employment, and took courses to improve his employment opportunities. The de-
fendant's personal characteristics permitted a downward departure pursuant to 18 USC §
3553(a)(1) which provides that federal judges may consider "the history and characteristics
of the defendant." Rodriguez, 724 F Supp at 1119.
211. "The Guidelines were promulgated in part to eliminate disparity in sentencing
and should not lightly be laid aside; yet sentencing remains more an art than an exact sci-
ence." Alba, 933 F2d at 1120.
212. See Harrington, 947 F2d at 963, 968 n 1 (Edwards concurring) (discussing judicial
discretion under the Guidelines and providing a supporting Appendix'of Cases and
Authorities).
213. During sentencing, one United States District Judge stated:
Let me tell you, and you can take this message back to ... [the United States Attor-
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Nevertheless, downward departures were severely limited to
those rare cases that were truly extraordinary, if not super-ordi-
nary. These cases not only transcended the typical and ordinary
"heartland," but also exceeded the merely atypical and unusual
conditions, and included sufficiently and substantially atypical and
unusual circumstances that justified a departure.
The Guidelines imply that broad judicial discretion destroys
"uniformity" for those persons "similarly situated."'" This logic
presumes that fixed sentencing rules, tempered with narrow judi-
cial discretion, accurately positions offenders within the finite sen-
tencing ranges. Such "uniformity," however, substantially depends
upon the consistent efforts of the Assistant United States Attor-
neys.115 Unfortunately, not all "similarly situated" offenders are
truly similarly situated in terms of their diverse offender and com-
plex human circumstances. To this end, fixed rules coupled with
narrowly guided policy statements are, on occasion, insufficient
and inappropriate.
Broadening the district judge's reasonable discretion to consider
merely "atypical and unusual" specific offender characteristics, as
opposed to those characteristics that are extraordinary and "not
ordinarily relevant," would significantly change the Guidelines.216
ney's office]: . . . I think it is my job to see that justice is meted out fairly, and that's
what the guidelines are trying to do-supposedly trying to do. And there seems to be
a lack of coordination in your office on how these cases are handled.
I sentenced five men the other day in a gigantic conspiracy. I mean these guys were
out there unloading marijuana from planes. And two of the plea agreements provided
for probation. And you want these 18, 21-year old guys to get 27 months when your
office comes in here and makes deals suggesting probation or three years for guys who
are involved in giant conspiracies involving millions of dollars.
Maybe your office doesn't see it, because you each handle different cases, and have
different philosophies, but I see it every day. And as long as I have anything to say
about it, justice is going to be handled out on an even basis. I don't care if they are -
from Mexico, Canada, or the United States. We are going to handle it the way I see,
and the way I think is right and fair.
Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F2d at 646, quoting District Judge Alfredo C. Marquez and affirming
a downward departure for the marginal culpability of drug "mules." See notes 70-75'and
accompanying text.
214. In other words, "similarly situated" within one of 258 guideline ranges.
215. See USSG § 5K1.1 ps (cited in note 4) (providing departures for substantial assis-
tance only "upon motion of the government"); Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F2d at 646 (see note
213) (questioning the Government's failure to consistently negotiate plea agreements). See
also United States v Boshel, 728 F Supp 632, 637 (ED Wash 1990), vacated, 952 F2d 1101
(9th Cir 1991) (questioning the shift of discretion from qualified and tested jurists to inex-
perienced and unproven Assistant United States Attorneys).
216. The standard of review, however, would remain clearly erroneous. See note 61
and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, such broadened discretion could be limited to first-
time offenders with two or more "not ordinarily relevant" specific
offender characteristics.217 These changes would further two pur-
poses of criminal punishment - just punishment and rehabilita-
tion - and permit the fair expansion of the envelope in the con-
tinuing evolution of the Guidelines.
Kirk D. Houser
217. For example, such characteristics could include: age, employment record or em-
ployment-related contributions, family ties, community ties, public service, or prior good
works. Other factors, such as impressive rehabilitation, should also be considered.
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